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We present a method to test quantum behavior of quantum information processing devices, such
as quantum memories, teleportation devices, channels and quantum key distribution protocols. The
test of quantum behavior can be phrased as the verification of effective entanglement. Necessary
separability criteria are formulated in terms of a matrix of expectation values in conjunction with
the partial transposition map. Our method is designed to reduce the resources for entanglement
verification. A particular protocol based on coherent states and homodyne detection is used to
illustrate the method. A possible test for the quantum nature of memories using two non-orthogonal
signal states arises naturally. Furthermore, closer inspection of the measurement process in terms of
the Stokes operators reveals a security threat for quantum key distribution involving phase reference
beams.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 42.50.Ex, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum communication protocols can perform tasks
that are not possible classically such as quantum key dis-
tribution [1, 2], teleportation [3], and quantum memory
[4]. Additionally, quantum communication can outper-
form possible classical counterparts, as is the case for
superdense coding [5].
In experimental realizations (see, e.g., Refs. [6, 7, 8]),
imperfections are inevitable, and the advantage over a
classical strategy may be lost. For example, a classi-
cal strategy for a quantum memory performs a quantum
measurement on the incoming signal, stores the result
classically, and prepares a quantum state corresponding
to the stored result as output. For quantum key distri-
bution (QKD), the classical strategy to compare against
is an intercept-resend attack. A typical test for quantum
memories and teleportation devices is to monitor the fi-
delity of the stored or transmitted quantum states and
to compare the observed value to the theoretical limit for
classical strategies [4, 9, 10].
Especially in infinite-dimensional systems, however,
knowing which fidelities are classically achievable is non-
trivial. The question is answered for Gaussian distribu-
tions of coherent input states in Ref. [10], but an answer
for general input states is still outstanding. Also, from an
experimental viewpoint, a continuum set of test states,
such as a Gaussian distribution, is problematic, and a
test involving only a small number of input states would
be preferable.
The test we develop here does not make direct use
of any figure of merit and has a simple structure: The
quantum device is tested on a set of non-orthogonal signal
states, and the corresponding output states are then mea-
sured in one of a few measurement settings. In some sit-
uations, for example, in testing QKD devices or quantum
teleportation setups, there might be two parties, possibly
at distant locations, one party (Alice) preparing the input
states, and the other (Bob) performing measurements on
the output states. In this case, the two parties might
make use of classical public communication to collect the
necessary information to evaluate the test. In other sit-
uations, like testing a quantum memory, the preparation
and measurement can be performed by one and the same
party.
The test procedure can be reformulated using an
entanglement-based description. In this formulation, an
alternative description of the state preparation is used
[11], where Alice creates a bipartite, entangled state and
sends one subsystem to Bob. By performing a suitable
measurement on her own subsystem, she can effectively
prepare the desired signal state. In general, before Al-
ice’s and Bob’s measurements, we will have an effective
entangled state shared by the two parties. As far as the
action of the quantum device and Bob’s measurements
are concerned, both formalisms are equivalent.
The main test idea is that classical devices, in
the special meaning introduced above, will always de-
stroy any entanglement between Alice and Bob in the
entanglement-based description. Conversely, if entan-
glement in the underlying state can be shown from the
measurement data, then the minimal requirement of ac-
tual quantum behavior of the device relevant to quantum
communication is demonstrated. Note that the notion of
2classicality tested here and relevant to the use of the de-
vices in a quantum communication context differs from
the notion of classicality often discussed in a quantum
optical context [12].
To use entanglement verification as a first test of a
protocol has been proposed in the context of quantum
key distribution [13, 14]. The underlying idea has also
been used to show ultimate limits for specific QKD
protocols [15, 16]. For other tasks, such as the storage
of quantum states, translation to an entanglement-based
picture and verification of quantum correlations may
provide an easily implementable test.
We present in this paper a method to verify entan-
glement especially suitable for bipartite optical systems,
which is in principle not limited to a particular Hilbert
space dimension or specific choices of measurements. We
define the bipartite expectation value matrix, which al-
lows to detect entanglement even if only partial informa-
tion on the system is available.
Section II gives the general definitions and proper-
ties connected to the verification method. Its workings
are exemplified in Section III on a discrete-continuous
cryptography protocol with homodyne detection. Fur-
thermore, the applicability of the verification method to
quantum memories is discussed. Section IV revisits the
same protocol and takes into account the phase reference
necessary for the detection process. The resulting de-
scription in terms of the Stokes operators will serve as
a second example of the applicability and limitations of
the entanglement verification method and raise questions
about the security of quantum key distribution based on
homodyne detection. We show that the security may be
compromised by changes in the phase reference inten-
sity. Section V investigates remedies in the form of addi-
tional measurements. Additional results for the presence
of channel losses are given in Section VI. We close with
a conclusion in Section VII.
II. GENERAL ENTANGLEMENT
VERIFICATION METHOD
In this section we address the problem of entanglement
verification in the situation, in which the measurements
performed on a bipartite system are not tomographically
complete, i.e., the density matrix of the underlying state
cannot be completely characterized. An attempted de-
scription in terms of the density matrix will consequently
involve many undetermined parameters and will quickly
become impractical for higher dimensions.
Instead, each set of measurement outcomes defines an
equivalence class of compatible states and the specifica-
tion of this equivalence class, say in the form of a matrix,
holds all accessible information. The size of such a matrix
description then depends on the number of measurements
rather than the Hilbert-space dimensions, and can thus
be substantially smaller than the density matrix. More-
over, this description enables the determination of en-
tanglement conditions, by searching the equivalence class
for separable states. To this end, we utilize the bipartite
expectation value matrix (EVM) (cf. [17]) as an object
which contains all measured information on the state.
In the following, we first present the general construc-
tion and properties of the EVM and then explain how to
use it for a separability criterion.
A. Construction of the Expectation Value Matrix
Suppose Alice’s and Bob’s systems are associated with
Hilbert spaces HA and HB , respectively, and the joint
system is in the state ρAB, acting on HA ⊗ HB . Fur-
ther suppose that Alice’s and Bob’s measurements are
described by operators Aˆ†i Aˆk and Bˆ
†
j Bˆl, respectively, for
appropriate sets {Aˆi} and {Bˆj}. Then the entries of the
bipartite EVM are defined as
[χ(ρAB)]ij,kl = Tr(ρABAˆ
†
i Aˆk ⊗ Bˆ†j Bˆl). (1)
A similar construction in terms of creation and an-
nihilation operators leads to the so-called matrix of
moments employed by Shchukin et al. to find criteria for
non-classicality [18] and separability [19, 20]. The latter
method was extended to finite-dimensional systems in
Ref. [21].
Observation 1: The expectation value matrix defined
by Eq. (1) is Hermitian and positive-semidefinite for all
physical states ρAB.
Proof: The EVM is Hermitian since
χ†ij,kl = χ
∗
kl,ij
= Tr(ρABAˆ
†
kAˆi ⊗ Bˆ†l Bˆj)∗
= Tr(ρAB[Aˆ
†
i Aˆk ⊗ Bˆ†j Bˆl]†)∗
= Tr(ρABAˆ
†
i Aˆk ⊗ Bˆ†j Bˆl)
= χij,kl.
Non-negativity is shown with the following argument:
Given a physical state ρAB, the quantity Tr(ρABMˆ
†Mˆ)
is non-negative for all operators Mˆ . Assuming the partic-
ular bipartite form Mˆ =
∑
i,j cijAˆi ⊗ Bˆj with the above
sets {Aˆi} and {Bˆi}, we find
0 ≤ Tr(ρABMˆ †Mˆ)
=
∑
ij,kl
c∗ijTr(ρABAˆ
†
i Aˆk ⊗ Bˆ†j Bˆl)ckl
=
∑
ij,kl
c∗ij [χ(ρAB)]ij,kl ckl,
=
∑
ij,kl
~c †χ(ρAB)~c, ∀~c
so χ(ρAB) is a positive-semidefinite matrix.
3Remarkably, the class of expectation value matrices
contains, by suitable choices of the sets {Aˆi} and {Bˆj},
the system’s density matrix itself as well as the reduced
density matrices. An EVM can also contain other useful
quantities, such as the covariance matrix. An explicit
construction of an EVM which contains ρA and a variant
of the covariance matrix of subsystem B is used in
Sec. III.
B. Entanglement Criterion Based on Partial
Transposition
Quantum correlations exist in the measurement data
if the equivalence class of states compatible with the ob-
served EVM can be shown to contain no separable states.
We will use the partial transposition to verify this. Due
to the product structure of separable states [22], trans-
position of either subsystem will result in another valid
physical state. Therefore, if the partial transpose of a
state σ is not positive, σ must be entangled [23].
This property translates to the EVM. Since χ(ρAB) ≥
0 for all physical states ρAB, violation of
χ(ρTAAB) ≥ 0 (2)
is a sufficient condition for ρAB to be entangled. The
same holds for the transpose of subsystem B. In fact, a
positivity requirement on a matrix, such as Eq. (2), gives
rise to a family of inequalities (cf. [19]), since Eq. (2)
holds true if and only if all principle submatrices of
χ(ρTAAB) have non-negative determinants [24]. Negativ-
ity of any one of these sub-determinants provides a suf-
ficient entanglement criterion, a non-trivial example of
which will be given in Sec. IV.
To evaluate the EVM on ρTAAB, we use the invariance
of the trace under partial transposition of its argument.
The partial transpose of the state can thus be transferred
to a transposition of Alice’s measurement operators, i.e.:
[χ(ρTAAB)]ij,kl = Tr(ρAB[(Aˆ
†
i Aˆk)
T ⊗ Bˆ†j Bˆl]). (3)
The usefulness of the entanglement criterion depends on
the connection between the operators Aˆ†i Aˆk and their
transpose. In the examples that we consider, it turns out
that each transposed operator is merely a scalar multiple
of one of the original operators, as illustrated in Sec. III.
Partial transposition is only one of many possible op-
erations to detect entangled states. In fact, any positive
but not completely positive map may be used as long as
the adjoint map can act on the measurement operators
in a meaningful way.
C. Limited Information
It may occur in experimental situations that not all
entries of the EVM can be measured, however carefully
the sets {Aˆi} and {Bˆj} are chosen. Entries which are not
accessible must be represented by complex-valued free
parameters. The criterion (Eq. (2)) can still be evaluated
in this case by rephrasing it as follows: If it is not possible
to find a set of free parameters such that
χ(ρAB) ≥ 0 and χ(ρTAAB) ≥ 0, (4)
ρAB must have been entangled. This search through
all possible parameter sets is efficiently done with
semidefinite programming [25]. If it was known which
parameter sets are compatible with physically valid
states, the criterion (Eq. (4)) with limited informa-
tion would be as strong as the criterion (Eq. (2)) for
the fully known EVM. This question for physically al-
lowed parameter sets is, however, unanswered at present.
It is important to note that the verification scheme is,
in principle, completely general, since neither the defini-
tion (Eq. (1)) of the EVM nor the conditions in Eq. (4)
contain assumptions about the measurements or the di-
mensionality.
III. APPLICATION TO A QKD PROTOCOL
WITH BINARY MODULATION
One of the strengths of using the EVM-based entangle-
ment verification method is that high-dimensional states
can be represented by a low-dimensional matrix, which
will be of particular advantage in the continuous-variable
regime.
We now apply the verification scheme to quantum key
distribution. When effective entanglement can be veri-
fied in a particular implementation, the possibility of an
intercept-resend attack is excluded.
The example we use to illustrate the entanglement ver-
ification method is a very simple protocol for quantum
key distribution [17, 26]. Alice generates a random classi-
cal bit-string which she wishes to share with Bob and use
to distill secret key. To achieve this, she simply encodes
each “0” in a coherent state |α〉 and each “1” in | − α〉,
with α real and positive, and sends those signal states
over a quantum channel to Bob. The notion of security
arises form the non-orthogonality of the two signal states
|α〉 and | − α〉.
In the equivalent entanglement based picture, Alice’s
source prepares bipartite states
|ψ〉AB =
1√
2
(|0〉A|α〉B + |1〉A| − α〉B). (5)
A subsequent projective measurement {|0〉A〈0|, |1〉A〈1|}
effectively prepares the above signal states. Also, since
system A remains in the source, Alice has complete
knowledge of the reduced density matrix ρA.
Under the action of the quantum channel the origi-
nally pure signal states evolve to mixed ones. We denote
the resultant states at Bob’s site by ρ0 if Alice sent a 0
4and by ρ1 if Alice sent a 1. These conditional states are
fed into a standard homodyne detection setup [27] where
they interfere with a strong coherent reference beam on
a balanced beam splitter. The intensity difference of the
output arms gives access to the field quadratures, de-
fined as xˆ = (aˆ† + aˆ)/
√
2 and pˆ = i(aˆ† − aˆ)/√2. We
assume here that for each incoming signal ρi, i ∈ {0, 1},
Bob can measure 〈xˆ〉i, 〈pˆ〉i,Vari(xˆ) and Vari(pˆ), where
〈xˆ〉i = Tr(ρixˆ) and Vari(xˆ) = 〈xˆ2〉i − 〈xˆ〉2i (and likewise
for pˆ).
The existence of entanglement for the present quantum
key distribution protocol has been investigated in [17].
We will reproduce the results of this analysis using the
method outlined above and show the equivalence of both
approaches (see Appendix A).
With the given measurements, the EVM is con-
structed in a straightforward way by choosing {Aˆi} =
{|ψ〉〈0|, |ψ〉〈1|}, where |ψ〉 is some generic (and irrele-
vant) qubit state, and {Bˆj} = {1ˆB, xˆ, pˆ}. Consequently,
we obtain the 6× 6 matrix
χ(ρAB) =


〈
|0〉〈0| ⊗B
〉
ρAB
〈
|0〉〈1| ⊗B
〉
ρAB〈
|1〉〈0| ⊗B
〉
ρAB
〈
|1〉〈1| ⊗B
〉
ρAB


with
B =


1ˆB xˆ pˆ
xˆ xˆ2 xˆpˆ
pˆ pˆxˆ pˆ2

 .
Note the special property that ρA is included in the
above EVM, so χ(ρAB) indeed contains all information
obtainable from the protocol.
We now evaluate the EVM on the partially transposed
state ρTAAB. Taking an example entry and using the afore-
mentioned invariance of the trace under partial transpo-
sition, we find
[χ(ρTAAB)]2,6 = Tr(ρ
TA
AB[|0〉〈1| ⊗ xˆpˆ])
= Tr(ρAB[|0〉〈1| ⊗ xˆpˆ]TA)
= Tr(ρAB[|1〉〈0| ⊗ xˆpˆ])
= [χ(ρAB)]6,2 (6)
and similarly for the other entries. Hence, χ(ρTAAB) is the
block transposition of χ(ρAB).
Another important point is the undetermined entries
of the EVM mentioned above. Both off-diagonal blocks,
for example, are completely unknown with the exception
of their (1,1) entries. Each unknown entry is represented
by a complex number, so that the EVM is parameterized
as
χ =
1
2


1 〈xˆ〉0 〈pˆ〉0
〈xˆ〉0 〈xˆ2〉0 a+ i2〈pˆ〉0 a− i2 〈pˆ2〉0
s


1 c d
c f g
d g − i h


s


1 c∗ d∗
c∗ f∗ g∗ + i
d∗ g∗ h∗


1 〈xˆ〉1 〈pˆ〉1
〈xˆ〉1 〈xˆ2〉1 b+ i2〈pˆ〉1 b− i2 〈pˆ2〉1


, (7)
where s = 〈−α|α〉, a and b are real parameters and
{c, . . . , h} are complex. In the above parameterization,
the commutator [xˆ, pˆ] = i1ˆ was used to relate the prod-
ucts xˆpˆ and pˆxˆ to each other. Knowledge of the expecta-
tion value of the commutator is crucial for the success of
the method. An example where this expectation value is
not known is given in Section IV.
Evaluating the entanglement criterion is now a matter
of finding parameter sets {a, b, . . . , h} such that the
EVM satisfies the conditions given in Eq. (4). The task
is simple in the sense that there exist efficient algorithms
to solve this semidefinite feasibility problem [28, 29, 30].
Before presenting results of the numerical analysis, we
comment on entangled states with positive partial trans-
position (PPT). Since our method is based on the nega-
tivity of the partial transposition, no such states can be
detected. The following observation, however, shows that
the given structure of signal states and measurements on
system A do not allow the detection of PPT entangled
states on principle, independent of the method.
Observation 2: (Compare Lemma 2 in [17]) Let ρ be a
PPT entangled state not detected by the EVM method.
Then there exists a separable state compatible with the
same measured data.
Proof: χ(ρTA) is the block transposition of χ(ρ) and
therefore fits the same experimental data. Then so
does the sum (χ(ρTA) + χ(ρ))/2, which is the EVM of
ρ¯ = (ρTA + ρ)/2. This state ρ¯ is invariant under trans-
position of subsystem A. Theorem 2 in Ref. [31] states
that any state of dimension 2 × N which is invariant
under transposition of subsystem A is separable. We ar-
gue in Appendix B that this theorem is applicable to the
inifinite-dimensional state ρ¯ and therefore, ρ¯ is separable.
A. Numerical Results for the Sufficient Condition
Results of the numerical evaluation of the semidefinite
program naturally rely on actually measured values of the
known entries of the EVM. In the following, we simulate
these experimental outcomes with a loss and noise model.
The channel loss is modeled as a scaling factor
√
η for the
first quadrature moments, i.e., 〈xˆ〉output0/1 →
√
η〈xˆ〉input0/1 ,
and similarly for pˆ. Noise in the channel is assumed not to
affect the first moments, but to act as a broadening in the
observed variances. The variances are incorporated in the
EVM (Eq. (7)) by writing 〈xˆ2〉0/1 = 〈xˆ〉20/1+Var(xˆ), and
〈pˆ2〉0/1 = 〈pˆ〉20/1 + Var(pˆ). Unless otherwise stated, the
noise is modeled to increase Var(xˆ) and Var(pˆ) equally
(cf. [17]). A corresponding physical setup is a perfect
channel with an inserted beam splitter, so that losses
are attributed to the beam splitter’s reflectivity. Feed-
ing a thermal state into the second input port of the
beam splitter can simulate the channel noise. Conse-
quently, this noise model always leads to physical expec-
5tation values and actual experimental results are in good
agreement with this model [26]. It should be noted that
the verification method itself is independent of the choice
of noise model.
Due to the particulars of the noise model, each dis-
tinct set of measurement outcomes is characterized, for
a fixed loss value, by only two parameters. Namely, the
input state overlap 〈−α|α〉, as chosen by Alice, and the
quadrature variance measured by Bob. All parameter
pairs with 0 ≤ 〈−α|α〉 ≤ 1 and Var(xˆ) = Var(pˆ) ≥ 1/2
are physically valid.
Figure 1 shows which of these parameter pairs stem
from entangled states. The plot is shown for η = 1.
Corresponding curves for other values of the channel
transmission have the same characteristic shape, but
a smaller gradient, cf. Fig. 2 in Ref. [17]. We see that
entangled states are detected as long as the excess noise
is not too high. The tolerable excess noise decreases for
smaller input overlaps. Actual experiments can deliver
values well within this region of entangled states [26].
Note that an extension to heterodyne detection would
allow the measurements of |i〉〈i| ⊗ xˆpˆ and |i〉〈i| ⊗ pˆxˆ, for
i ∈ {0, 1}. However, although this reduces the number of
free parameters in the EVM, the results shown in Fig. 1
would remain the same for the given channel model.
FIG. 1: Input state overlap plotted against measured quadra-
ture variances for a loss-less channel. Data points in the grey
shaded area must stem from entangled states. The variance
broadening induced by the optimal intercept-resend attack is
indicated by the black dots.
B. Refining the Method to be Necessary and
Sufficient
Whenever the conditions in Eq. (4) are met, the en-
tanglement verification method is inconclusive, since the
numerically-found solution may be unphysical. The ques-
tion whether a given EVM corresponds to a physical
state has no straightforward answer. Therefore, we sup-
plement the method by searching for specific separable
states compatible with those data sets satisfying Eq. (4).
This search is equivalent to finding specific intercept-
resend attacks [13]. In such an attack, an eavesdropper
(Eve) measures out the signal states when they leave the
source and resends appropriately chosen new states ac-
cording to her measurement outcomes, thus acting as an
entanglement-breaking channel [32].
Intuitively, the non-orthogonality of the signal states
protects against such attacks. When Eve tries to
distinguish |α〉 and | − α〉 and reassign new signals
accordingly, she inevitably makes errors which will be
detectable in Bob’s observations. In our case, these
errors will manifest themselves in the form of increased
uncertainties. Hence, for large measured variances we
always expect to find an intercept-resend attack, in
analogy to bit-error rates above 25% in the qubit-based
BB84 protocol [33].
A promising, and ultimately successful, choice of mea-
surement for the eavesdropper is a minimum-error dis-
crimination described in Ref. [34]. For the signal states
| ± α〉, the resulting error probability is given by
e =
1
2
− 1
2
√
1− |〈−α|α〉|2. (8)
Implementations of this minimum error discrimination
measurement are discussed in Ref. [35].
In other words, if we assume Eve to resend either |ψE0 〉
or |ψE1 〉, she makes a wrong choice with probability e.
As a result, Bob’s states, conditioned on the original bit-
values, become
ρB,E0 = (1 − e)|ψE0 〉〈ψE0 |+ e|ψE1 〉〈ψE1 |, (9)
ρB,E1 = (1 − e)|ψE1 〉〈ψE1 |+ e|ψE0 〉〈ψE0 |. (10)
The exact form now depends on the choice of |ψE0/1〉.
We note here that since the original coherent ampli-
tudes α have been chosen to be real, the expected vari-
ance broadening from the attack will only occur in the
xˆ-direction (cf. Fig. 2). However, Bob expects to observe
equal variances in xˆ and pˆ, which is achieved by the eaves-
dropper with appropriate squeezing operations. Hence,
a natural choice of states is
|ψE0/1〉 = Dˆ(±β)Sˆ(r)|0〉, (11)
where Dˆ and Sˆ are the displacement and squeezing op-
erators, respectively, and r is a real squeezing parameter
[36].
For each input overlap, the parameters β and r can
now be adjusted to reproduce the values 〈xˆ〉0/1 and 〈pˆ〉0/1
expected by Bob, while inducing the least possible excess
variance. Denoting the input state overlap by s and the
channel transmission again by η, the analytic form of the
resulting variances in Bob’s measurements reads
VarB,E(xˆ) = VarB,E(pˆ) =
1
2
(
f +
√
f2 + 1
)
,
f = η
s2 ln s
s2 − 1 ,
6FIG. 2: a) Marginal distribution for the input state |ψ0〉 =
|α〉. b) Bob’s conditional state ρB,E
0
after the interaction of
the eavesdropper. With probability (1− e), Eve resent |ψE0 〉;
with probability e, she erroneously resent |ψE1 〉.
and is shown in Fig. 1. We see an exact coincidence
with the entanglement verification curve. This coinci-
dence holds for all channel loss values.
The combination of this attack with the entanglement
verification method is necessary and sufficient to decide
whether measured data is compatible with a separable
state or not, for all possible data sets.
C. Asymmetric Variances
To assume equal variances for position and momen-
tum in Bob’s observations may be unjustified in some
situations, but an extension of the above scheme to un-
balanced excess noise is straightforward. The total mea-
sured variance will be comprised of input variance and
excess noise, i.e.,
Vartot(xˆ) = Varin(xˆ) + V ex(xˆ) =
1
2
+ V ex(xˆ),
and similarly for pˆ. We find that, even in the case
V ex(xˆ) 6= V ex(pˆ), the maximum tolerable noise of en-
tangled states and the minimum variance broadening in-
duced by an attack (Eq. (11)) coincide.
D. Application to Quantum Memories
We conclude this section with a short discussion on the
application of the verification method to quantum mem-
ories. Recently, storage of continuous-variable states of
light was realized [37]. It was demonstrated that squeez-
ing of vacuum input states was still observable in the
output light.
If any two non-orthogonal input states |φ0/1〉 are cho-
sen for testing a quantum memory, we can translate
the storage process to an entanglement-based picture, in
complete analogy with Eq. (5), with | ± α〉B replaced by|φ0/1〉. Since the entanglement verification method only
depends on the input-state overlap and the first and sec-
ond moments of the quadratures of the output light, it is
applicable to this situation, independent of the particular
workings of the storage and readout process.
Verifiable entanglement in this picture is sufficient to
ensure the quantum nature of the memory. Since this
strategy requires no tomographically complete measure-
ments, its experimental realization will require less re-
sources.
IV. THE EVM WITH STOKES OPERATORS
This section examines the protocol more closely by in-
cluding the so-called local oscillator. This auxiliary light
beam is used as a reference to define the signal states’
phase and is necessary for homodyne detection. If the
local oscillator is in a coherent state of high intensity
compared to the signal, the detection setup can be used
to measure the field quadratures, as in the previous sec-
tion.
Ideally, the phase reference is prepared locally, but to
ensure phase stability, it is common practice to split off
the local oscillator in the signal preparation process and
send it to Bob over the same quantum channel as the
signal. The oscillator then inevitably passes through the
insecure domain controlled by the eavesdropper and we
cannot make unverified assumptions about its state at
Bob’s site. Consequently, the detection process should
be regarded as a true two-mode measurement and we
will employ the Stokes operators to describe it.
A. Stokes Operators
Typically, the Stokes operators are used to describe the
quantum polarization of light using a decomposition into
two modes of orthogonal polarization (see, e.g., Ref. [38]).
In our case, the modes are spatially separated and we
will label them with subscripts “s” and “LO” to denote
the signal and the local oscillator, respectively. In this
language, the input signal states are denoted by
|ψ〉0/1 = |αLO,±αs〉. (12)
The Stokes operators are defined in terms of mode oper-
ators as
Sˆ1 = aˆ
†
saˆs − aˆ†LOaˆLO
Sˆ2 = aˆ
†
saˆLO + aˆ
†
LOaˆs
Sˆ3 = i(aˆ
†
LOaˆs − aˆ†saˆLO),
and the total intensity is often included in the set:
Sˆ0 = aˆ
†
saˆs + aˆ
†
LOaˆLO.
Their commutation relations are those of the su(2) alge-
bra, namely,
[Sˆi, Sˆj] = 2iǫijkSˆk (13)
for {i, j, k} = {1, 2, 3}, and ǫijk is the Levi-Civita symbol.
Sˆ0 commutes with the other Stokes operators. As a con-
sequence of Eq. (13), the minimum uncertainty product
7of any two Stokes operators depends on the expectation
value of the third:
Var(Sˆi)Var(Sˆj) ≥ |〈Sˆk〉|2. (14)
One other property worth mentioning is the operator
identity
Sˆ21 + Sˆ
2
2 + Sˆ
2
3 = Sˆ
2
0 + 2Sˆ0. (15)
B. Entanglement Verification
The Stokes operators are measured by direct detection
of intensity differences [39]. If the two incoming light
modes are spatially separated, the setup is identical
to that of a homodyne apparatus. Detecting the
xˆ-quadrature then corresponds to an Sˆ2-measurement
and the pˆ-quadrature to Sˆ3. We therefore assume that
the two-mode detection process gives access to the
expectation values and variances of Sˆ2 and Sˆ3.
An EVM is now constructed in complete analogy to
the previous section, with {Bˆi} = {1ˆ, Sˆ2, Sˆ3}, resulting
in a matrix similar to (7). The crucial difference is the
commutator, which is unknown for this setting since it
is proportional to the unmeasured quantity 〈Sˆ1〉. The
known entries of this EVM are modeled to reflect ac-
tual experimental data. As before, losses can be modeled
to downscale the first moments and noise is included as
broadening of the variances of Sˆ2 and Sˆ3.
Numerical results are shown in Fig. 3, again with the
assumption that the observed variances in Sˆ2 and Sˆ3 are
equal. Figure 3 and all following figures are drawn for
the loss-less case, since channel loss does not qualita-
tively change the results. An additional figure including
channel loss can be found in Section VI.
FIG. 3: Signal state overlap plotted against the Stokes opera-
tor variance for a loss-less channel and local oscillator ampli-
tude αLO = 100. Only data points above the grey shaded area
are physically allowed. Solid curve: entanglement verification
without additional measurements. Dashed line: Intercept-
resend attack with equal amplitudes in both modes. Dotted
line: input state variance for reference.
There are two important points to note: Firstly, unlike
the quadratures, the variances of the Stokes operators are
not intensity-independent for coherent state input of the
form (Eq. (12)). Rather, Var(Sˆi) = 〈Sˆ0〉 holds true for all
four Stokes operators when evaluated on coherent states
[38]. Hence, the variances of the input states are also
plotted. Due to the channel noise, actual measurement
results are not expected below this coherent state curve.
Secondly, one can show that data sets below the en-
tanglement verification curve are in fact unphysical. As
mentioned above, every valid physical state must lead to
a positive EVM, which implies that all principle minors of
χ˜(ρ) must have non-negative determinants. Taking rows
and columns (1,2,4) to form a particular submatrix, we
require
det


1 〈Sˆ2〉0 s
〈Sˆ2〉0 〈Sˆ22〉0 c
s c∗ 1

 ≥ 0,
with s = 〈−α|α〉 as before and c denotes a free parameter
(cf. Eq. (7)). Evaluating the determinant leads to
Var0(Sˆ2) ≥ 〈Sˆ2〉
2
0s
2 − 2s〈Sˆ2〉0Re(c) + |c|2
1− s2 . (16)
Positivity of the sub-determinant (1,4,5) translates to the
similar condition
Var1(Sˆ2) ≥ 〈Sˆ2〉
2
1s
2 − 2s〈Sˆ2〉1Re(c) + |c|2
1− s2 . (17)
According to the noise model, 〈Sˆ2〉0 = −〈Sˆ2〉1 and
Var0(Sˆ2) = Var1(Sˆ2) ≡ Var(Sˆ2). Adding (16) and (17)
then gives the final condition
Var(Sˆ2) ≥ s
2〈Sˆ2〉20 + |c|2
1− s2 , (18)
which is obviously minimized for c = 0. Plotting this
minimum allowed variance against s exactly coincides
with the entanglement verification curve shown in Fig. 3.
Consequently, no entangled states are detected by our
method in the current measurement setting.
To refine this last statement, we can again search for
data pairs compatible with separable states by construct-
ing a specific intercept-resend attack. The optimal mea-
surement is the same as before, but the eavesdropper now
resends
|ψE〉0/1 = DˆLO(β)Dˆs(±β)Sˆs(r)|0〉LO|0〉s, (19)
with appropriately chosen parameters. The intuition
behind this particular choice is that equal coherent
amplitudes for signal and local oscillator can lead to the
same first moments of Sˆ2 and Sˆ3 as the original signals,
but the total intensity is significantly decreased. This
equal-amplitude attack can in principle lead to lower
8variances in Bob’s observations than the input states
would give, and this is indeed the case, as illustrated in
Fig. 3. In fact, in the limit of high photon numbers, the
gap between existence curve and attack vanishes.
C. Implications for Quantum Key Distribution
Concluding this section, we find that entanglement ver-
ification is not possible with measurements of the first
and second moments of Sˆ2 and Sˆ3 only. Almost all phys-
ically valid data sets admit an intercept-resend attack
and are therefore compatible with separable states. No
secure key can be distilled from such data.
Since homodyne detection is a standard tool for
continuous-variable quantum communication, such as
quantum key distribution with a Gaussian distribution
of coherent signal states [40, 41], the above attack may
be a pitfall for a variety of protocols. Care must be taken
that indeed the field quadratures are measured. Ways to
ensure this are presented in the following section.
V. ADDITIONAL MEASUREMENTS
We consider two additional experimentally feasible
measurements and investigate their effect on the perfor-
mance of entanglement detection.
A. Measuring Sˆ1
A natural choice is the measurement of the third Stokes
operator Sˆ1. Its expectation value and variance are eas-
ily included in the EVM by choosing the constructing
set {Bˆi} = {1ˆ, Sˆ1, Sˆ2, Sˆ3}, enlarging χ(ρAB) to an 8 × 8
matrix. It is now also possible to use the commutator
(Eq. (13)) of Sˆ2 and Sˆ3 to relate products of the form
Sˆ2Sˆ3 and Sˆ3Sˆ2 to each other. Since the entanglement
verification method is otherwise identical to the preced-
ing sections, we directly present the results in Fig. 4.
There is a large area above the input state variance for
which entanglement is ensured. In fact, if the results for
the quadrature measurements are renormalized by the
local oscillator intensity, they coincide with the present
curve.
There is an intuitive explanation for these results.
Since 〈Sˆ1〉 is the difference between the number of pho-
tons in the signal mode and that in the local oscillator
mode, measuring 〈Sˆ1〉 provides a way of verifying that
the phase reference is indeed much more intense than
the signal. In this case, we expect to be able to measure
the quadratures. A conceivably simpler way to achieve
this verification is to monitor the local oscillator intensity
separately.
FIG. 4: Signal state overlap plotted against the Stokes opera-
tor variance for the loss-less case with αLO = 100. The renor-
malized quadrature variances (white circles) coincide with the
Stokes operator variances when Sˆ1 is measured. Dashed line:
input state variance for reference.
However, these are truly additional measurements in
the sense that the original setup must be modified.
Therefore, in Section VB, we briefly examine the sit-
uation where, instead of 〈Sˆ1〉, the total intensity 〈Sˆ0〉 is
measured.
B. Measuring the total intensity
The value of 〈Sˆ0〉 is obtained when the two photocur-
rents in Sˆ2 or Sˆ3 detection are added rather than sub-
tracted. Depending on the experimental particulars, the
total intensity may be available “for free” with no change
in the setup necessary [42]. The variance of Sˆ0 is not in-
cluded in the analysis, since the intensity measurement is
expected to be much more noisy than the measurements
of the other Stokes operators.
Constructing an EVM from {Bˆi} = {1ˆ, Sˆ0, Sˆ2, Sˆ3}
gives no advantage over the case when Sˆ0 is not included.
As far as entanglement detection is concerned, the re-
sults are identical to those shown in Fig. 3 above. How-
ever, the powerful equal-amplitude attack (Eq. (19)) is
not possible in this setting, and a new intercept-resend
strategy must be constructed. The goal is to show a con-
ceptual difference from quadrature measurements, i.e., to
find an attack that explains data sets which would be at-
tributed to entangled states, if quadrature detection was
assumed. A corresponding attack can indeed be found.
Its construction builds on the correspondence between a
collection of photons in two possible polarization modes
and an ensemble of spin-half particles aligned along some
quantization axis. In fact, the Schwinger representation
of spin operators [43] differs from the above definition of
the Stokes operators only by factors of 2: Sˆ1,2,3 = 2Jˆz,x,y.
For Eve’s attack, we use the particular squeezing op-
9eration
Uˆ(µ) = exp(−µ
8
(Jˆ2+ − Jˆ2−)),
called two-axis countertwisting [44], where Jˆ± = Jˆx±iJˆy.
Her explicit states are given by
ρE0/1 = p|ψ(n
−)
0/1 〉〈ψ(n
−)
0/1 |+ (1 − p)|ψ(n
+)
0/1 〉〈ψ(n
+)
0/1 | (20)
|ψ(n−)0/1 〉 = Rˆ(±
π
2
, 0)Uˆ(µ)|j, j〉 (21)
|ψ(n+)0/1 〉 = Rˆ(±ζ, 0)Uˆ(µ)|j, j〉 (22)
where |j, j〉 is an angular momentum eigenstate, ζ is a
small rotation angle and n+ (n−) are photon numbers
larger (smaller) than the total photon number Bob ex-
pects to measure. Both the rotation operator Rˆ(θ, φ)
[36] and the two-axis countertwisting operator conserve
the total intensity.
The minimum variance broadening induced by this at-
tack is plotted in Fig. 5 together with the entanglement
verification curve for quadrature measurements. There
are data sets from separable states well below the latter
curve, so monitoring 〈Sˆ2〉, 〈Sˆ3〉, and the total intensity is
not equivalent to quadrature detection and gives weaker
results for entanglement verification. However, the at-
tack was not evaluated for high photon numbers due to
numerical limitations.
FIG. 5: Performance of a 2-axis squeezing attack for 100 pho-
tons. Dashed line: Entanglement verification with quadrature
measurements. Solid line: Intercept-resend attack with 2-axis
twisting for Stokes operator detection and monitoring of the
total intensity.
To be able to draw a comparison for more realistic
intensities, we can replace Eq. (22) by a quadrature
squeezed state, i.e.
|ψ(n+)0/1 〉 = DˆLO(α˜LO)Dˆs(±α˜s)Sˆs(r˜+)|0〉LO|0〉s.
The need for numerical evaluation is completely removed
by the further simplification
|ψ(n−)0/1 〉 = DˆLO(β˜)Dˆs(±β˜)SˆLO,s(r˜−)|0〉LO|0〉s,
where SˆLO,s is the two-mode squeezing operator. Al-
though both of these simplifying steps deteriorate the
effectiveness of the attack, they can still account for data
points below the quadrature entanglement verification
curve (Fig. 6). The resulting gap does increase with the
total photon number, albeit at a much lower rate.
FIG. 6: Different attacks for a total intensity of 104.
The dashed line results form entanglement verification with
quadrature detection. Solid line: Attack with a mixture of
2-axis twisted and quadrature squeezed states for Stokes and
total intensity measurements. Dotted line: The same attack
with 2-mode squeezing instead of 2-axis countertwisting.
Still, a large number of data points is neither explained
by the intercept-resend attack nor detected by the entan-
glement verification method. It remains unclear if the
measurements do not provide enough information on the
state or if the construction of the EVM is unsuited to
verify entanglement for this particular scheme.
VI. ADDITIONAL FIGURE FOR CHANNEL
LOSS
This final section concerns the effect of channel loss on
all of the above results involving the Stokes operators.
It is easily seen that the first moments of the Stokes op-
erators scale as the channel transmission η, just as the
reference coherent state variance. The existence curve,
Eq. (18), however scales as η2 and so does the corre-
sponding intercept-resend attack. Typical results in the
presence of loss are shown in Fig. 7 for 50 % channel
transmission, together with the entanglement verification
including 〈Sˆ1〉.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have constructed bipartite expecta-
tion value matrices as a description of systems with par-
tial knowledge. Such matrices were used to formulate
general sufficient criteria for entanglement, which allow
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FIG. 7: The above Stokes operator variances for a channel
which transmits half of the input intensity.
the evaluation of partial transposition for, in principle,
arbitrary dimensions and measurement operators.
The EVM method was applied to a communication
protocol with coherent signal states and homodyne
detection. With the assistance of an intercept-resend
strategy, detection of the first and second moments
of the field quadratures was sufficient to attribute all
possible measurement outcomes to either separable or
entangled states. A more complete description of the
measurements in terms of Stokes operators revealed the
inaptitude of the protocol to generate secret key. Two
examples of additional measurements were considered
to rectify this issue. Monitoring of the local oscillator
intensity was found to recover the quadrature results.
Instead, monitoring the total intensity showed data sets
neither explainable by entanglement verification nor by
the best known intercept-resend strategy. Thus, this last
example demonstrated that the success of the presented
method crucially depends on the choice and structure
of Bob’s measurements. This example also underlined
the need for a criterion to decide which expectation
value matrices are physically valid, which would result
in stronger separability conditions. This question is,
however, unanswered at present, and subject to future
research.
Moreover, the presented method is proposed as a sim-
ple way to test quantum devices, which may be of partic-
ular interest for the continuous-variable storage of light.
Two non-orthogonal signal states and detection of the
first and second moments of the field quadratures of the
output light suffice to verify the quantum operation of
the memory, with no need for a complete reconstruction
of the output density matrix. The particular light-atom
interactions in the storage process are, as far as entan-
glement verification is concerned, not relevant.
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APPENDIX A: EQUIVALENT METHODS
In Ref. [17], the constructed entanglement criteria are
based on uncertainty relations. We will show that this
approach is equivalent to our method based on partial
transposition. Rigas et al. [17] constructed a symmetric
version of the EVM defined as
χs(ρ) :=


〈
|0〉〈0| ⊗Bs
〉
ρ
〈
|0〉〈1| ⊗Bs
〉
ρ〈
|1〉〈0| ⊗Bs
〉
ρ
〈
|1〉〈1| ⊗Bs
〉
ρ

 (A1)
with Bs given by
Bs :=


1ˆ xˆ pˆ
xˆ xˆ2 12 (xˆpˆ+ pˆxˆ)
pˆ 12 (xˆpˆ+ pˆxˆ) pˆ
2

 . (A2)
Then the inequalities
χs(ρ)± i
2
ρA ⊗ J˜ ≥ 0, (A3)
with
J˜ =


0 0 0
0 0 −1
0 1 0

 ,
are satisfied by all separable states, and violation implies
entanglement.
These two inequalities turn out to be equivalent to the
conditions
χ(ρ) ≥ 0 and χ(ρTB ) ≥ 0 (A4)
for the unsymmetrized EVM. Product entries can be split
into their symmetrized product and commutator:
xˆpˆ =
1
2
(xˆpˆ+ pˆxˆ) +
1
2
[xˆ, pˆ] (A5)
=
1
2
(xˆpˆ+ pˆxˆ) +
1
2
i, (A6)
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so that χ(ρ) = χs(ρ)− i/2 ρA ⊗ J˜ .
Since Bob’s operators are transposed according to the
rule xˆ→ xˆ and pˆ→ −pˆ, we find that
χ(ρTB ) = Uχ˜(ρ)U †, (A7)
where U = 1A⊗ diag[1, 1,−1] and χ˜(ρ) is given by (A1),
with Bs replaced by
B˜ :=


1ˆ xˆ pˆ
xˆ xˆ2 pˆxˆ
pˆ xˆpˆ pˆ2

 . (A8)
Then χ˜(ρ) = χs(ρ) + i/2 ρA ⊗ J˜ , i.e. the two conditions
(A3) are, up to a local unitary transformation, equivalent
to (A4).
APPENDIX B: SUPPLEMENTARY PROOF FOR
OBSERVATION 2
We show that Theorem 2 in Ref. [31] applies to the
infinite-dimensional case, i.e., to states ρAB on HA⊗HB
with dim(HA) = 2 and dim(HB) =∞. That is, we prove
the statement that if such a state ρAB is invariant under
transposition of subsystem A, it is separable. To this
end, we approximate ρAB by finite-dimensional states
σ
(N)
AB = N (1A ⊗ P (N)B )ρAB(1A ⊗ P (N)B ), (B1)
with normalization factor N and the projection operator
P
(N)
B =
N∑
k=1
|k〉B〈k|. (B2)
The vectors {|k〉B}∞k=1 form a basis for system B. Intu-
itively,
‖ρAB − σ(N)AB ‖tr ≡ δN , (B3)
lim
N→∞
δN = 0 (B4)
where ‖ . . . ‖tr denotes the trace norm. In other words,
the sequence {δN} is convergent. Therefore, ∀ǫ, ∃ n ∈ N
such that ρAB and σ
(n)
AB are closer than ǫ in trace distance.
Furthermore, σ
(n)
AB is invariant under transposition of
system A:
(σ
(n)
AB)
TA = N [(1A ⊗ P (N)B )ρAB(1A ⊗ P (N)B )]TA (B5)
= N [(1A ⊗ P (N)B )TAρTAAB(1A ⊗ P (N)B )TA ] (B6)
= N [(1A ⊗ P (N)B )ρTAAB(1A ⊗ P (N)B )] (B7)
= N [(1A ⊗ P (N)B )ρAB(1A ⊗ P (N)B )] (B8)
= σ
(n)
AB , (B9)
as by assumption, ρTAAB = ρAB. Therefore, σ
(n)
AB is sepa-
rable. Consequently, ρAB is approximated by a convex
combination of product states, so ρAB is separable [22].
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